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ABSTRAK 
 
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui pengaruh Ukuran Dewan, Dewan 
Komisaris Independen, Kepemilikan Institusi, dan Kepemilikan Pemerintah 
terhadap Audit Delay Pada Perusahaan Perbankan yang Terdaftar di Bursa Efek 
Indonesia Tahun 2014-2016. 
Penelitian ini termasuk dalam penelitian kausal komparatif. Populasi dalam 
penelitian ini adalah perusahaan perbankan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek 
Indonesia periode 2014-2016. Pemilihan sampel menggunakan metode purposive 
sampling. Terdapat 35 perusahaan yang memenuhi kriteria sebagai sampel 
penelitian, kemudian data penelitian yang dianalisis dalam tiga periode 
pelaporan yaitu tahun 2014-2016, sehingga diperoleh total populasi 105 
perusahaan. Data yang digunakan adalah data sekunder dan teknik analisis data 
menggunakan statistik deskriptif, uji asumsi klasik, dan analisis regresi linear 
berganda. 
Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa Ukuran Dewan, Dewan Komisaris 
Independen, Kepemilikan Institusi, dan Kepemilikan Pemerintah secara simultan 
berpengaruh signifikan terhadap Audit Delay. Dibuktikan dengan nilai 
signifikansi F sebesar 0,00, lebih kecil dari 0,05 (0,00 <0,05). Persamaan regresi 
Y = 120,394 – 6,987X1 – 17,367X2 – 23,803X3 – 44,919X4. Dilihat dari tabel 
koefisien diketahui bahwa Ukuran Dewan, Kepemilikan Institusi, dan 
Kepemilikan Pemerintah berkolerasi secara signifikan, sedangkan Dewan 
Komisaris Independen tidak berkolerasi secara signifikan. Hal ini ditunjukkan 
dari nilai signifikansi (Ukuran Dewan = 0,000, Dewan Komisaris Independen = 
0,346, Kepemilikan Institusi = 0,003, Kepemilikan Pemerintah = 0,000) yang 
berarti Ukuran Dewan, Kepemilikan Institusi, dan Kepemilikan Pemerintah 
berpengaruh signifikan terhadap Audit Delay, sedangkan Dewan Komisaris 
Independen tidak berpengaruh signifikan terhadap Audit Delay. 
 
 
Kata Kunci : Audit Delay, Ukuran Dewan, Dewan Komisaris Independen, 
Kepemilikan Institusi, Kepemilikan Pemerintah 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this study was to analyze the effect of Board Size, Board of 
Independence Commissioner, Institutional Ownership, and Governmental 
Ownership on Audit Delay. 
This study is a causal comparative research. The population of this research 
is banking companies listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange period 2014-2016. The 
sample is selected by using purposive sampling method. Based on determined 
criteria, 35 companies are selected, then research data are analyzed in three 
reporting periods of 2014-2016, became the total population of 105 companies. 
The data used are secondary data and data analysis techniques using descriptive 
statistics, classic assumption test, and multiple regression analysis. 
The result of this study showed that Board Size, Board of Independence 
Commissioner, Institutional Ownership, and Governmental Ownership affect on 
Audit Delay. It is prove by the significant value of F by 0,00, lower than 0,05 
(0,00<0,05). The regression equation Y = 120.394 – 6.987X1 – 17.367X2 – 
23.803X3 – 44.919X4. It can be seen from the coefficients table that Board Size, 
Institutional Ownership and Governmental Ownership are correlated significantly, 
while Board of Independence Commissioner are not significantly correlated. This 
is indicated from the significance value (Board Size = 0.000, Board of 
Independence Commissioner = 0.346, Institutional Ownership = 0.003, 
Governmental Ownership = 0.000) which means Board Size, Institutional 
Ownership, and Governmental Ownership can significantly affect Audit Delay, 
while Board of Independence Commissioner do not significantly affect Audit 
Delay. 
 
Keywords : Audit Delay, Board Size, Board of Independence Commissioner, 
Institutional Ownership, Governmental Ownership 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A. Problem Background 
Indonesia’s rapid growth in investment, especially investment through 
capital markets, has triggered an increase in the use of financial statement audit 
services. Companies have to fulfil one of the requirements to be a go public 
company obliged its companies to present its financial statements by Standar 
Akuntansi Keuangan (SAK) and conducted an audit by a public accountant 
registered by Governmental regulators for its financial statements. The audited 
financial statements as a result of an audit by public accountant have 
consequences and responsibilities which is a form of auditor professionalism. 
The timeliness of the company in publishing its financial statements to public 
and regulators also depends on its timeliness of auditor in completing their audit 
work. The timely financial reports in its presentation, the benefit contained in it 
can be said relevant, thus helping users of financial statements in using its 
information.  
The capital market has set the timeliness of the delivery of its financial 
statements. A regulation from Badan Pengawas Pasar Modal (BAPEPAM) in 
Peraturan Badan Pengawas Pasar Modal Nomor: KEP-346/bl/2011 regarding 
the Issuer's Annual Report (Penyajian Laporan Keuangan), states that public 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange must submit annual financial 
statements to BAPEPAM. Then, public companies must announce to the public 
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no later than the end of the third month after the report date financial annually 
based on Financial Accounting Standards and audited by Public Accountant 
registered with BAPEPAM. Annual financial statements announced at least 
included the statements of financial position (balance sheet), statements of 
comprehensive income, cash flow statements, and opinions of accountants. If the 
companies are late in submitting reports by the provisions set by BAPEPAM, 
they will be subject to administrative sanctions by its clause set out by the law. 
Standar Profesional Akuntan Publik (SPAP) issued by Dewan Standar 
Profesional Akuntan Publik Institut Akuntan Publik Indonesia (DSPAP IAPI), 
particularly on standard of fieldwork set out procedures for completing 
fieldwork. Its standard, such as; a need for recording of activities to be 
undertaken, a suffice understanding of the internal control structure, and the 
collection of competent evidence obtained through inspection, observation, 
submission of questions and confirmations as a basis for expressing an opinion 
on the financial statements. Audits that conducted by the standards will take 
longer time and vice versa. 
Timely presentation of a company's financial statements may affect its 
value. Information delays will cause a negative reaction from capital market 
participants. Investors will begin to suspect that the company is slowing the 
release of its financial statements, whereas audited financial statements 
containing the earnings information generated by the company concerned to 
serve as one of the bases of decision making to buy or sell ownership owned by 
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investors. Chambers and Penman (1984) point that late financial statement 
announcement, even though gain a profit, it will cause negative abnormal returns 
while faster financial statement announcement leads the opposite. Delays in 
reporting, indirectly provide negative assumptions by investors to the company. 
The duration of the completion of this audit may affect the publication of 
the timely financial reporting of its delivery information. Andi Kartika (2009) 
concluded that the timeliness in the preparation and financial reporting of a 
company could influence the value of these financial statements. Relevant 
financial information on the financial statements is not sufficient for investors to 
make decisions, the timeliness of receiving financial statements is also necessary 
so that the data obtained still new. Timeliness indicates that the financial 
statements should be presented at a certain time interval, to explain changes in 
the company that may affect the user information in decision making. The time 
span between the date of the financial statements and the date of audit opinion in 
its financial statements issued is an indication of audit time length completed by 
the auditor. This is the time difference in audit or called as audit delay. The 
longer its audit delay means, the longer its auditor in completing their audit work. 
In the opposite, the less time span that exists, the users of these financial 
statements can more quickly see the results of these financial statements to use. 
From the number of studies on audit delay to companies listed on the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX), the results vary from each of its research. 
This is due to differences in the independent variables used, the different 
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observation periods performed, or the distinct statistical methods used. From 
many factors that are affecting Audit Delay in a company, several factors may 
affect companies listed on the IDX, that is corporate governance mechanisms. 
The role of the corporate governance mechanism is expected to function as a tool 
to provide confidence to investors that companies managed by directors and 
management can be in line with what is expected by shareholders. This is in line 
with the agency theory. Part of the corporate governance mechanism are 
including; board size, board of independence commissioner, institutional 
ownership, and Governmental ownership.  
The factor of board size is of concern because the board of 
commissioners responsible for the overall financial statements and information 
issued. As the opinion expressed by Sultana et al. (2015) that the board of 
commissioners serves as an intermediary between the parties in the financial 
reporting process. Regarding quantity, the size of a large board of commissioners 
is more capable of exercising responsibility in overseeing the company's goals 
and direction. Therefore, this study will use the measurement of the total amount 
in the board of commissioners. 
Next factor that may affect audit delay is board of independence 
commissioner. The board of commissioners consists of outside members, who 
are not internal or corporate managers, often act as a separator of disagreements 
among internal managers and other agency issues. Peasnell et al. (2002) argue 
that the independence and integrity of the board of commissioners play a 
 5 
 
significant role in ensuring the quality and reliability of the published financial 
statements. A hypothesis that put forward by Carcello et al. (2002) state that 
independent boards take greater responsibility for monitoring, which reduces the 
risk of audit controls, as it allows auditors to limit the scope of work of the 
independent board of commissioners and improve the timeliness of the audit. 
A third factor that may affect audit delay is institutional ownership. 
Barako et al. (2006) argue that institutional investors' shares provide them with a 
stronger incentive to monitor disclosure practices. Managers are encouraged to 
voluntarily release company information to meet the overall expectations of 
shareholders. Hsu and Koh (2005) show that institutional investors play an active 
role in improving the efficiency of information in the capital market.  
The last factor that could have an impact on audit delay is Governmental 
ownership. In Indonesia, there are several companies whose primary ownership 
is owned by the Governmental. As stated by Niemi (2005), Governmental 
ownership is different from other forms of proprietorship. Chen et al. (2011) 
argue that Governmentals often not to perform ineffective control, despite having 
majority ownership. 
The financial sector is a sector that has the main function of channeling 
funds from the excess to those who lack funds. One of the financial sectors is 
banking. According to UU No. 10 tahun 1998 tentang Perbankan (Banking), 
Banks are business entities that collect funds from the public in the form of 
deposits and channel to the public in the form of credit and/ or other forms in 
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order to improve the standard of living of the people. The role of banking which 
is so vital for the economy makes the sector need to be monitored closely and 
specifically by the government. In addition to having to fulfill the obligation to 
BAPEPAM to submit annual financial reports and independent auditor reports, 
banks must also comply with regulations set by the competent authority to 
submit audited financial statements by an independent auditor. Peraturan 
Otoritas Jasa Keuangan Number 6/POJK.03/2015 concerning Transparency and 
Publication of Bank Reports (Transparansi dan Publikasi Laporan Bank) states 
that banks are required to announce an Annual Publication Report on the website 
of the bank and Otoritas Jasa Keuangan’s website no later than four months after 
the end of the financial year. 
In Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX), banking is one of the largest 
commodities of many existing sectors. Judging from market capitalization by 
sector, the financial sector has the largest market capitalization value among 
other sectors. The market capitalization value grew from 2014, where the 
banking is a financial sub-sector, has a value of Rp 1.217 trillion, of which the 
financial sector has a value of Rp 1.263 trillion. The consumption industry sector 
which has the second largest capitalization value, has a value of Rp 1.013 trillion. 
In 2015, both the value of banking and financial sector capitalization fell to Rp 
1,132 trillion and Rp 1,232 trillion. Meanwhile, the market capitalization of the 
consumption industry sector is worth Rp 1.129 trillion. In 2016, the market 
capitalization of banks rose to reach Rp 1,338 trillion, where the financial sector 
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itself has a market capitalization of Rp 1.417 trillion. This value is higher 100 
trillion rupiah compared to the consumption industry sector which has the second 
largest market capitalization after the financial sector, which amounted to Rp 
1.312 trillion. 
 
Figure 1. Growth of Market Capitalization 
In addition to banking compliance with Governmental regulations, a large 
market capitalization rates for the banking sub-sector as well as the financial 
sector and has become one of the main commodities for investors in IDX. Thus, 
it’s becomes one of the points that the need for a way to shorten the audit delay 
time by paying attention to good corporate governance mechanisms, so that 
financial statements can be used as a tool of decision makers. With the 
background above, the researcher wanted to research with the title “The Effect 
Of Factor From Corporate Governance Mechanism Towards Audit Delay (An 
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Empirical Study at Banking Companies Listed on Indonesian Stock Exchange in 
2014 - 2016)”. 
B. Problem Identification 
Based on the problem background, problems can be identified as follows: 
1. The timely submission of financial statements will provide relevant benefits to 
the financial statements. This medium can help users of financial statements in 
using the information in it. 
2. The late of financial statement announcement even though gain a profit, 
causing negative abnormal returns while the publication of the sooner 
financial statements announcement creates the opposite. 
3. Corporate governance mechanism as a solution for shareholders to oversee the 
performance of directors and management, in line with agency theory. Some 
factors of the corporate governance mechanism are; board size, board of 
independence commissioner, institutional ownership, and governmental 
ownership. 
4. Banks must comply with regulations set by the competent authority to submit 
audited financial statements by an independent auditor. Banks are required to 
announce an Annual Publication Report on the website of the bank and 
Otoritas Jasa Keuangan’s website no later than four months after the end of 
the financial year. 
5. High market capitalization value in the banking sector indicate that this sector 
is one of the major commodity sectors from many sectors in the IDX. The 
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banking sector which is a major investment commodity in the capital market 
is fundamentally believed to be in its financial statements. Thus, the reporting 
of financial statements needs to be accelerated, especially in the banking 
sector. 
C. Problem Restriction 
This study is limited to four variables that have the possibility of affecting 
audit delay that is the board size, board of independence commissioner, 
institutional ownership, and Governmental ownership. The population used is a 
banking company listed on IDX in 2014-2016. For the data used for this study 
comes from secondary data that is the financial statements of each company that 
contains the provision of public accountant opinions published in 2014-2016 
D. Problem Formulation 
Based on the restrictions problem, the problems in this research can 
formulate as follows: 
1. How do the effect of Board Size towards Audit Delay at banking companies 
listed on IDX in 2014-2016? 
2. How do the effect of Board of Independence Commissioner towards Audit 
Delay at banking companies listed on IDX in 2014-2016? 
3. How do the effect of Institutional Ownership towards Audit Delay at banking 
companies listed on IDX in 2014-2016? 
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4. How do the effect of Governmental Ownership towards Audit Delay at 
banking companies listed on IDX in 2014-2016? 
5. How do the effect of Board Size, Board of Independence Commissioner, 
Institutional Ownership, and Governmental Ownership towards Audit Delay 
at banking companies listed on IDX in 2014-2016? 
E. Research Objectives 
Based on the problem formulation, the purposes of achieving are to analyze: 
1. The effect of Board Size towards Audit Delay at banking companies listed on 
IDX in 2014-2016. 
2. The effect of Board of Independence Commissioner towards Audit Delay at 
banking companies listed on IDX in 2014-2016. 
3. The effect of Institutional Ownership towards Audit Delay at banking 
companies listed on IDX in 2014-2016. 
4. The effect of Governmental Ownership towards Audit Delay at banking 
companies listed on IDX in 2014-2016. 
5. The effect of Board Size, Board of Independence Commissioner, Institutional 
Ownership, and Governmental Ownership towards Audit Delay at banking 
companies listed on IDX in 2014-2016. 
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F. Research Benefits 
The researcher hopes is that this research can provide benefits for the 
parties in need, both from the theoretical and practical aspects, such as: 
1. Theoretical Benefits 
The results of this study are expected to provide insight and add 
reference issues that affect audit delay on banking companies listed on IDX, 
as well as a reference for future research. 
2. Practical Benefits 
a. For Auditors 
The results of this study are expected to be used as information to 
assist auditors in optimizing audit performance by identifying factors 
that affect audit delay. Therefore, the auditor can complete the audit 
work on time either time set based on Governmental regulations or 
faster. 
b. For Companies 
The results of this study are expected to be a consideration in 
determining the policies that can be used to overcome the factors that 
cause audit delay, thereby minimizing audit delay in order to make the 
publication of audited financial statements timely. 
c. For Investors and Potential Investors 
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The results of this study are expected to be a consideration for 
investing in a company that can help investors and potential investors in 
choosing the right company and worth spent. 
d. For Researcher 
This research is expected to increase writer's knowledge about 
audit delay and influencing factor because the writer gets a direct picture 
that can be trusted. Researchers also hope that with this research, then 
by future researchers will continue to develop research on audit delay 
and factors that influence it. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A. Theoretical Review 
1. Agency Theory 
The agency relationship exists when one party (the principal) hires 
another party (agent) to execute a service and delegates authority to decide 
on its agent (Reny Dyah, 2012). Jensen and Mecking (1976) gave statements 
about agency theory which the manager of a company called an "agent", and 
a shareholder is called a "principal". Principal delegates business decisions 
to managers as representatives or agents of such shareholders or principals. 
Problems often arise, when an agent doesn’t always make decisions that 
meet the interests of the principal, this is a problem with the ownership 
system in a company. 
Agency theory has an assumption that the objectives of the principal 
and the purpose of different agents can lead to a conflict. Managers tend to 
make decisions about their personal needs, which results in differentiation of 
focus taken by agents and principals because managers are more concerned 
with achieving short-term earnings, while shareholders want long-term 
profits. Thus, shareholders who have different functions with managers as 
executors of the company, need to be protected by rights to the company by 
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using a mechanism, so it can resolve agency conflict. Corporate governance 
as an efficacious mechanism with the objective of minimizing agency 
conflicts, with particular emphasis on legal mechanisms preventing the 
execution of majority or minority shareholders (R. Dhanis, 2012). Corporate 
governance is one of the ways to improve economic efficiency, which 
consists of various relationships between company management, a board of 
commissioners, shareholders, and other stakeholders. 
2. Financial Statements 
In Standar Akuntansi Keuangan (IAI, 2007) defines financial 
statements as part of financial reporting. Complete financial statements 
usually include a balance sheet, an income statement, a statement of changes 
in financial position which presented in various ways, for example as a cash 
flow statement or fund flow statement, this note and report and explanatory 
materials that are an integral part of the financial statements. It also includes 
schedules and additional information relating to it, such as industry and 
geographical segment financial information, and disclosure of the effects of 
price changes.  
According to Zaki Baridwan (2004), financial statements are a 
summary of the process of recording of financial transactions of an entity 
that occurred during its relevant book year. The financial statements are a 
substantial component in which their existence is used as decision-making 
by the principals and other parties who need its financial statement 
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information (Althaf, 2016). Thus, the financial statements containing 
historical data on corporate financial transactions is useful not only for 
corporate management in making corporate decisions but also helpful for 
shareholders in assessing the performance of the company over the course of 
a year and beneficial for other stakeholders. 
3. Audit Delay 
According to Subekti and Novi (2004), audit delay is the length of 
time audit completion conducted by the auditor as measured from the time 
difference between the date of the financial statements with the fall out of 
audit opinion in the financial statements. Aryati and Maria (2005) explained 
that to measured an audit delay is by the length of days required to obtain an 
independent auditor's financial report on the audit of the company's financial 
statements from the closing period of the company's book, as of December 
31, to the day set forth in the independent auditor's report. 
In some studies, audit delay is also referred to as an audit report lag, 
using the measurement of the time difference between the end of the fiscal 
year with the date of issuing the audit report. Dyer and McHugh (1975), 
divide the delay or the lag as follows: 
a. Preliminary lag, i.e. the interval between the end of the fiscal year until 
the date of receipt of the preceding financial statements by the capital 
market. 
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b. Auditor’s signature lag, i.e. the interval between the end of the fiscal year 
to the date specified in the auditor's report. 
c. Total lag, i.e. the time lapse between the end of the fiscal year until the 
date of receipt of the financial statements of the year of publication by the 
capital market. 
Thus, audit delay is the period required by the auditor in completing 
the audit work and measured from the date of the end of the fiscal year, i.e. 
December 31 until the date listed on the auditor's report. Its measurement 
uses the number of days, from the closing date of the fiscal year to the date 
of issuance of the audited financial statements. The duration of the audit 
delay will affect the timeliness of the financial statements. 
4. Board Size 
According to UU No. 40 Tahun 2007 regarding Incorporated Company 
(Perseroan Terbatas pasal 1 ayat 6) states that the board of commissioners 
is the organ of the company that must conduct supervision in general and/ or 
by the articles of association and give advice to the directors of the company. 
The board of commissioners serves as an intermediary between the parties in 
the financial reporting process as well as the key to the corporate oversight 
function (Sultana et al., 2015). Thus, the board of commissioners is 
responsible for the overall financial statements and information issued. 
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5. Board of Independence Commissioner 
Komite Nasional Kebijakan Governance (KNKG) through Good 
Corporate Governance (GCG) general guidelines state that the board of 
commissioners may consist of and not from commissioners of affiliated 
parties, i.e. affiliated commissioners and independent commissioners. The 
independent commissioner shall ensure that the monitoring mechanism is by 
the laws and regulations effectively. One of the requirements that an 
independent commissioner must meet is having an accounting or financial 
background. 
Independent Commissioner according to Peraturan Bapepam-LK No 
IX.1.5 is a member of the board of commissioners: 
i. Derived from outside the issuer or public company; 
ii. Not a person who works for publicly-listed companies and companies 
and has the authority and responsibility to plan, lead, or control and 
oversee the activities of issuers or public companies within the last six 
months; 
iii. Not having any share either directly or indirectly in the issuer or public 
company; 
iv. Has no affiliation with public companies or issuer, Commissioner, 
Board of Directors or main shareholder of the issuer or public 
company; 
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v. Has no direct or indirect business relationship related to the business 
activities of the issuer or public company, and 
vi. No other connection may affect his ability to act independently. 
6. Institutional Ownership 
Institutional ownership defined by the large percentage of shares held 
by institutional investors (Midiastuty & Machfoedz, 2003). This 
concentration of outside ownership creates an effect that can change the 
management of the company by limiting management performance and 
monitoring it. Choi et al. (2013) highlight that institutional investors can 
actively monitor company operations, they have an effective effect on 
management decisions through their right-functioning voting rights. 
7. Governmental Ownership 
The Governmental as the owner or majority shareholder in a company 
has the right to control its business activities according to the objectives it 
wishes to achieve the potential to cause conflict with the management of the 
company. Governmental ownership leads the company's management 
performance to be inefficient and use it for various political purposes as the 
company (Wei, 2012). According to Cornett (2009), political bureaucrats 
have goals that often have political interests but are contrary to 
improvements in social welfare and the maximization of corporate value. 
Thus, the Governmental as the majority shareholding in a company tends to 
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hamper the company's performance because it has some interests that are not 
in line with the company. 
B. Relevant Research 
Several studies on factors that affect audit delay, i.e.: 
1. Research conducted by Mishari M. Alfraih (2016) 
This research entitled "Corporate governance mechanisms an audit 
delay in a joint audit regulation". This study was conducted on a company 
listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) with audit delay as the dependent 
variable and using six independent variables consisting of the combination of 
joint auditors, board size, board of independence commissioner, role duality, 
institutional ownership, and Governmental ownership. The results of previous 
research are variables of the combination of joint auditors, board size, board 
of independence commissioner, and role duality significant effect on audit 
delay. 
The similarity of this study with previous research is to use dependent 
audit delay variables and board size independent variables, board of 
independence commissioner, institutional ownership, and Governmental 
ownership. The difference lies in the use of the independent variables of 
previous research, the combination of joint auditors since firms listing in the 
KSE must be audited by a combination of two independent auditors, in 
contrast to the existing regulations in Indonesia. Meanwhile, the second 
 20 
 
difference exists on the use of previous research independent variables, 
namely the role of duality, wherein a company there is a CEO who acts as a 
board director. It also differs in the Indonesian system using a two-tier system 
in which the board of commissioners and board of directors are present.  
2. Research conducted by Roswita Savitri (2010) 
This research entitled "Pengaruh Mekanisme Corporate Governance 
Terhadap Ketepatan Waktu Pelaporan Keuangan: Studi pada Perusahaan 
Manufaktur di BEI". This research conducted at manufacturing industry 
companies listed on IDX period 2006-2008 with timeliness as a dependent 
variable and independent variable consisting of independent commissioner, 
managerial ownership, institutional ownership, audit committee, and audit 
quality. The results of the study were independent commissioners, managerial 
ownership, audit committee, and audit quality indicated a significant influence 
on audit delay, while institutional ownership variable had no significant effect 
on audit delay. 
3. Research conducted by Rizki Sakti Kornelius Butarbutar dan P. Basuki 
Hadiprajitno (2017) 
This study entitled "Analisis Faktor-Faktor yang Berpengaruh 
Terhadap Audit Report Lag (Studi Empiris pada Perusahaan Manufaktur 
yang Terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia Tahun 2012-2015)”. This research 
was conducted at manufacturing companies listed on IDX period 2012-2015 
with audit delay as a dependent variable and using seven independent 
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variables consisting of company size, public accountant office, company 
operation complexity, board size, audit committee size, public ownership, and 
concentrated ownership. The result of the research is the variable size of the 
board of commissioner and public ownership negatively affect audit report 
lag, while firm size, public accountant office, company operating complexity, 
audit committe size, and concentrated ownership do not affect audit report lag. 
C. Conceptual Framework 
1. The Effect of Board Size on Audit Delay 
The Board of Commissioners has responsibility for the financial 
statements and information issued therein. Especially information about the 
level of profitability. The Board of Commissioners acts as an effective 
executive decision control mechanism in dealing with agency issues caused 
by the separation of ownership and control of the company (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Based on the principle of agency theory; transparency, the 
absence of negligence, and timeliness of the agent are motivating the 
principal. Thus, more broad will provide focused control on each 
department. Therefore, the larger board size provides an expectation of 
effective coordination, efficiency, and communication; then a negative 
relationship between the proportion of the board of commissioners and audit 
delay can occur. 
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2. The Effect of Board of Independence Commissioner on Audit Delay 
The board of commissioners often act as a disagreement over 
disagreements among internal managers or corporate managers, thus acting 
as a separator between dispute as well as an agent problem solver at the 
company. There is much literature to suggest that, the independent board of 
commissioners shall be the majority of the composition of the board of 
commissioners, both to oversee moral hazard arising from the separation of 
ownership and control then to improve the audit process (Bradbury et al.: 
2006). Ultimately, this affects the nature, timing, and level of the audit, and 
leads to timely reporting. 
3. The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Audit Delay 
Investors who come from the same institution are effective corporate 
governance tools because they tend to discipline management more, and 
alleviate the problem of free passengers associated with company ownership 
(Rose, 2007). Choi et al. (2013) highlight that institutional investors can 
actively monitor corporate operations, they have a potent effect on 
management decisions through their right-functioning voting rights. 
Therefore, audit delay and concentration of institutional ownership can have 
a negative relationship. 
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4. The Effect of Governmental Ownership on Audit Delay 
Ownership of corporations owned by the Governmental, most or as a 
whole, is different than in companies with other forms of ownership. 
Governmental ownership leads to inefficient and undisciplined management 
of market regulation (Lim, 2012). Companies tend to report their financial 
statements are not in a timely manner because there is no greater external 
influence from the Governmental. Therefore, less efficient management 
teams will tend to disclose their financial statements inappropriately, 
resulting in larger audit delays. 
5. The Effect of Board Size, Board of Independence Commissioner, 
Institutional Ownership, and Governmental Ownership on Audit Delay 
The larger board size provides expectations for effective coordination, 
efficiency, and communication. Therefore, it is expected that there is a 
negative relationship between the size of the board of commissioners and 
audit delay. Majority composition in the board of commissioners must be 
filled by the board of independent commissioners, whether to oversee moral 
hazard arising from the separation of ownership and control and to improve 
the audit process. Institutional investors can actively monitor company 
operations, they have an effective effect on management decisions through 
their right-functioning voting power. Therefore, delay audit is expected to be 
negatively associated with the concentration of institutional ownership. 
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Influence from the interaction of 
independent variable to dependent 
variable. 
Governmental ownership leads to inefficient management since firms tend to 
be used for political purposes. Therefore, less efficient management teams 
will tend to disclose their financial statements in a timely manner, resulting 
in a larger audit delay. 
D. Research Paradigm 
After forming the above conceptual framework, this study will examine 
the effect of firm size, profitability, auditor quality, and audit opinion on audit 
delay in banking companies listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2014-2016 as 
follows:  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Explanation: 
     
Figure 2. Research Paradigm 
 
Audit Delay (Y) 
Institutional Ownership (X3) 
Board Size (X1) 
Board of Independence 
Commissioner(X2) 
Governmental Ownership (X4) 
 25 
 
E. Research Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of problem formulation in this research is: 
1. Board Size has a significant influence on audit delay in banking companies 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2014-2016. 
2. Board of Independence Commissioner has a significant influence on audit 
delay in banking companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2014-
2016. 
3. Institutional Ownership has a significant influence on audit delay in banking 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2014-2016. 
4. Governmental Ownership has a significant influence on audit delay in 
banking companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2014-2016. 
5. Board Size, Board of Independence Commissioner, Institutional Ownership, 
and Governmental Ownership simultaneously have a significant influence on 
audit delay in banking companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 
2014-2016. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
A. Research Design 
This study when viewed from the characteristics of the problem pertained 
as a comparative causal research because this study has a problem characteristics 
of causality between two variables or more (Indriantoro and Supomo, 2009). 
Based on its approach, this study is an ex-postfacto study. According to Widarto 
(2013), ex-postfacto research is a study, that aims to find the cause of behavioral 
changes, symptoms or phenomena of an event. In the study, there are dependent 
variables (variables affected) and independent variables (variables that affect). 
Based on the type of data used, this study is included as a quantitative study 
because it uses data in the form of numbers (Sugiyono, 2011). 
B. Place and Time of Research 
This research was conducted at a banking company listed on Indonesia 
Stock Exchange (IDX). The data obtained through the official website of IDX at 
www.idx.co.id. Research time was conducted in November 2017 to collect data, 
then in December 2017 analyzed the data and the preparation of research results. 
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C. Population and Sample of Research 
1. Population of Research 
Population is a generalization region consisting of objects/ subjects 
that have certain qualities and characteristics that are set to be studied and 
then taken on its conclusions (Sugiyono, 2011). The population in this study 
is a banking company listed on IDX in 2014-2016. 
2. Sample of Research 
The sample is part of the number and characteristics possessed by the 
population (Sugiyono, 2011). In this study, the technique used for sampling 
is by using purposive sampling method. Purposive sampling is a technique 
of random sample selection whose information obtained by using certain 
criteria (Sugiyono, 2011). The referred criteria in this study as follows: 
1) Companies registered in banking companies respectively on IDX in 
2014-2016 
2) The banking company has submitted its annual financial report 
respectively in 2014-2016 containing the data and information that can 
be used in this study, and the financial statements have been audited and 
accompanied by an independent auditor's report. 
After applying the criteria, then the banking companies listed on IDX 
and eligible in this study are as many as 35 companies. The period of time in 
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this study is for three times of its annual financial statements publication 
(2014-2016) so that the amount of data used as many as 105 research data. 
D. Operational Variable Definition 
To test the hypothesis listed above, the variables to be studied in this 
study can be classified into two, namely the dependent variable and the 
independent variable. In this study, the operational definition of variables is as 
follows:  
1) Dependent Variable (Y) 
Dependent variable is a variable that influenced or which become 
result because of the independent variable (Sugiyono, 2011). The dependent 
variable used in this study is audit delay. Audit delay is the length of time 
required by the independent auditor to complete the audit work. Its measured 
from the closing date of the fiscal year on 31 December to the date specified 
in the independent auditor's report. Measurements are made quantitatively in 
the number of days (Dyer and McHugh, 1975). 
 
 
 
2) Independent Variable (X) 
The independent variable is the variable that will affect the dependent 
variable. The independent variables used in this study are board size, board 
Audit Delay = Date of audit report – Date of financial 
statement 
Figure 3. Audit Delay’s Formula 
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of independent commissioner, Governmental ownership, and institutional 
ownership. 
a. Board Size 
Board of commissioners is a tool of corporate governance that helps 
solve company agency problems. More number of board members show 
better performance because the number of members considered more 
focused on each department. The mensuration of board size variables is 
measured by summing up the total of the existing board of commissioners 
(Alfraih, 2016). 
b. Board of Independent Commissioner 
Board of commissioners’ compositions of a company becomes an 
important point if the board is filled by an independent board of 
commissioners. They tend to be better at overseeing agency issues and 
preventing the emergence of moral hazards that can arise in the company. 
The mensuration of board of independent commissioner is measured by the 
number of independent board of commissioners divided by the total number 
of boards of commissioners (Alfraih, 2016). 
c. Institutional Ownership 
If a larger proportion of shareholding is owned by an institution, it will 
tend to provide good incentives. This has an impact on more effective 
corporate management and more disciplined management performance. The 
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measurement used for institutional ownership variables is the percentage of 
shares held by the investors of the institution itself (Alfraih, 2016). 
d. Governmental Ownership 
Governmental ownership of a company tends to be undisciplined, 
ignores market regulation and even hinders company growth because it 
affects organizational change (Lim, 2012). Governmentals tend to be weaker 
in monitoring company performance, weak accountability, and reducing 
incentives for strong governance mechanisms. To measure the variable of 
Governmental ownership is the percentage of shares owned by investors 
from the Governmental (Alfraih, 2016). 
E. Data Collection Technique 
For data collection method in this research using documentation method. 
Documentation method is done by copying and archiving data from an available 
source that is in the form of secondary data obtained from IDX website at 
www.idx.co.id. It is also obtained from other internet sources from the official 
website of the company concerned. Secondary data obtained are in the form of 
audited company financial statements and annual report of the company. 
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F. Data Analysis Technique 
1. Descriptive Statistical Analysis 
Descriptive statistics is the process of transforming research data in a 
tabular form so that it is easily understood and interpreted. Tabulation 
presents summary, arrangement, and compilation of data in the form of 
numeric tables and graphs. Descriptive statistics are used to describe and 
provide an overview of the distribution of variables in the study. This study 
describes the amount of data, minimum value, maximum value, average, and 
standard deviation. 
Data analysis methods that researchers do with the help of statistical 
data processing application program. Based on processed data from 
statistical data processing application which includes board size, board of 
independent commissioner, institutional ownership, Governmental 
ownership, and audit delay, it will know the minimum value, maximum 
value, average, and standard deviation of each variable. 
2. Classic Assumption Test 
To test whether the regression model used in this study is feasible or 
not to be used it is necessary to use the classical assumption. The classical 
assumption test used, among others; normality test, heteroscedasticity test, 
and multicollinearity test. 
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a. Normality Test 
Normality test aims to test whether, in a regression model, the 
intruder or residual variable has a normal distribution or not. A good 
regression model is to have normal or near-normal data distribution. 
This test can be done through statistical analysis (Ghozali, 2006). This 
statistical analysis is seen through Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) 
statistics. Decision making policy in K-S test is as follows: 
a. If the value of significance or probability value is greater than 5 
percent then the data is normally distributed. 
b. If the value of significance or probability value is less than 5 
percent then the data is not normally distributed. 
b. Autocorrelation Test 
Autocorrelation test aims to test whether in the linear regression 
model there is a correlation between the residuals in period t with the 
intruder error in period t-1 (previous period). A good regression model 
does not have autocorrelation in it. Autocorrelation can lead to habits of 
conclusions drawn on a linear regression. In time series data are often 
found autocorrelation because the disturbance in an individual or group 
tends to affect the disorder in the same individual or group in the next 
period (Ghozali, 2006). 
To detect autocorrelation symptoms in this study using the Durbin 
Watson (DW-Test) formula, using the Cochrane-Orcutt (C-O) method. 
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This method is an alternative to obtaining the value of the unknown 
autocorrelation structure (ρ), by using residual estimation values to 
calculate ρ. Having known the value of ρ, then transformed each 
variable, then DW-Test is done by looking at how many samples are 
studied which then seen the number of provisions on Durbin Watson 
table. The results are regressed and the regression results are then 
compared with each variable to obtain Durbin Watson (DW). The DW 
value is then compared with the upper limit value (dU) and the lower 
limit value (dL) for the various values of n (sample number) and k (the 
number of independent variables) present in the DW table with the 
following conditions: 
1) DW < dL, there is a positive autocorrelation (+) 
2) dL < DW < dU, cannot be inferred 
3) dU < DW < 4-dU, no autocorrelation occurs 
4) 4-dU < DW < 4-dL, cannot be inferred 
5) dW < 4-dL, there is a negative autocorrelation (-) 
c. Heteroscedasticity Test 
The heteroscedasticity test aims to test whether in the regression 
model there is a variance inequality of the residual one observation to 
another observation. If the variance of the residual one observation to 
the other observes remains, then it is called homoscedasticity and if 
different is called heteroscedasticity. A good regression model is a 
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homoscedasticity or which does not occur heteroscedasticity. Detecting 
whether heteroscedasticity or not can be done by looking at the plot 
graph between the dependent variable prediction value (ZPRED) and its 
residual (SRESID). If there are certain patterns, such as points that exist 
form a regular pattern (wavy, widened and then narrowed), then indicate 
there has been heteroscedasticity. 
d. Multicollinearity Test 
According Ghozali (2006) multicollinearity test aims to test 
whether the regression model found the existence of a correlation 
between independent variables. A good regression model should not be 
correlated among independent variables. To detect the presence or 
absence of multicollinearity in the regression model can be seen from 
the value of tolerance value and variance inflation factor (VIF). These 
two measures show which of the other independent variables are 
described by other independent variables. Tolerance measures the 
variability of selected independent variables that are not explained by 
other independent variables. So a low tolerance value is equal to a high 
VIF value. The common cut off value is: 
1) If the tolerance value is greater than 10 percent and the VIF value is 
less than 10, it can be concluded that there is no multicollinearity 
among independent variables in the regression model. 
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2) If the tolerance value is less than 10 percent, and the VIF value is 
greater than 10, it can be concluded that there is multicollinearity 
between independent variables in the regression model. 
e. Linearity Test 
Linearity test is used to ensure that the regression model used in 
the test data is linearly patterned or not(Ghozali, 2006). A good data is a 
data whose variables are linearly patterned. Linearity test in this study 
using Lagrange Multiplier Test which is the development of Ramsey 
Test. Criteria for linearity i.e: 
1) If the test results of linearity have a value of c2 <c2 count table, it 
means the regression model used is linear. 
2) If the result of linearity has a value c2 count> c2 table, it means 
regression model used is not linear. 
3. Hypothesis Testing 
a. Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
Multiple regression analysis is used to predict how the situation 
(up and down) of the dependent variable, if two or more independent 
variables as a predictor factor that can be reduced value (Sugiyono, 
2011). This model of analysis is used to test the effect of independent 
variables together on the dependent variable. The general equation of 
multiple linear regression is: 
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𝑌 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1𝑋1 + 𝑏2𝑋2 + 𝑏3𝑋3 + 𝑏4𝑋4 
Explanation: 
Y = Audit delay 
X1 = Board Size 
X2 = Board of Independent Commissioner 
X3 = Institutional Ownership 
X4 = Governmental Ownership 
b = Regression Coefficient 
a = Constants 
b. Determination Coefficient Testing 
The Coefficient of Determination (R2) aims to measure how far 
the ability of the model in explaining the variation of the dependent 
variable (Ghozali, 2006). The coefficient of determination is between 
zero and one. The small value of R2 means the ability of the 
independent variables to explain the variation of the dependent variable 
is very limited. A value close to one means the independent variables 
provide almost all the information needed to predict the variation of the 
dependent variable. If any adjusted value of R2 is negative, then the 
adjusted value of R2 is considered to be zero. 
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c. Simultaneous Significance Testing (F Statistical Test) 
The simultaneous significance testing (F statistical test) aims to 
measure whether all the independent variables included in the model 
have a mutual influence on the dependent variable (Ghozali, 2006). This 
simultaneous testing is done by comparing the level of significance F of 
the test results with significance value used in this study. Simultaneous 
test methods of independent variables used in this study are as follows: 
1) If the significance level F obtained from the processing value is 
smaller than the value of significance used is 5 percent it can be 
concluded that all independent variables simultaneously affect the 
dependent variable. 
2) If the significance level F obtained from the processing value is 
greater than the value of significance used is 5 percent it can be 
concluded that all independent variables simultaneously have no 
effect on the dependent variable. 
d. Individual Parameter Significance Test (t Statistic Test) 
The significance test of individual parameters (t statistic test) aims 
to measure how far the influence of one independent variable 
individually in explaining the variation of the dependent variable 
(Ghozali, 2006). Partial testing is done by comparing the significance 
level t of the test results with significance value used in this study. 
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Partial test methods of independent variables used in this study are as 
follows: 
1) If the significance value t of each variable obtained from the test is 
smaller than the value of significance used is 5 percent then the 
partially independent variables affect the dependent variable. 
2) If the significance value t of each variable obtained from the test is 
greater than the value of significance used is 5 percent then the 
partial independent variable does not affect the dependent variable 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 
A. Description of Data 
The research data comes from the Financial Report of Banking Sector 
Companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from the period of 2014 to 
2016 which is downloaded through the website page www.idx.co.id and some 
official website of the company concerned. From the available data selected 
some data through purposive sampling process, among others: (The resource 
from purposive sampling process as follows:) 
Table 1. Procedure of Purposive Sampling 
No Explanation Amount 
1. Banking sector companies that listed on IDX in a row in 
2014-2016 
43 
2. Banking sector companies in IDX that do not provide 
consolidated financial statements and do not have complete 
data of consistent research in 2014-2016 
8 
3. Number of companies sampled 35 
4. Number of samples (35 x 3 years) 105 
 Source: Processed data (2018) 
On the selection of these criteria, obtained 105 banking sector companies 
listed on IDX. 
B. The Result of Descriptive Statistical Analysis 
The descriptive statistical analysis describes minimum, maximum, mean, 
and standard deviation, as follows: 
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1. Audit Delay 
Table 2. The Result of Statistical Descriptive from Audit Delay 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Audit Delay 105 7 119 59,543 22,83 
 Source: Appendix 
Table 2 above shows that the value of Audit Delay is between seven 
days to 119 days with and average of 60,63 days and Standard deviation of 
22,205. The mean of the company’s Audit Delay sample is still below three 
months or 90 calendar days which is the limit set by BAPEPAM for the 
submission of the financial statements. The fastest Delay audit is 7 days 
from Bank Pembangunan Daerah Jawa Timur (BJTM) for the period of 2015 
and 2016 and the longest company for 119 days from Bank Pembangunan 
Daerah Banten (BEKS) in 2015. 
The data of Audit Delay could be categorized on the following 
criterion bellow. 
a. High Category  = ( > iM + 1 iSD) 
b. Medium Category = (iM – 1 iSD) until (iM + 1 iSD) 
c. Low Category  = (iM – 1 iSD) 
The formula to calculate Ideal Mean (iM), Ideal Standard Deviation 
(iSD), High, Medium, and Low Category as follows. 
Ideal Mean (iM)  = ½ (Maximum Score - Minimum Score) 
    = ½ (119 – 7) 
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    = 56 
Ideal Standard Deviation = 1/6 (Maximum Score – Minimum Score) 
    = 1/6 (119-7) 
    = 18,667 
High Category  = > (iM + 1 iSD) 
    = > (56 + 18,667) 
    = > 74,667 
Medium Category  = iM – 1 iSD until iM + 1 iSD 
    = 56 – 18,667 until 56 + 18,667 
    = 37,333 until 74,667 
Low Category  = < (iM - 1 iSD) 
    = < (56 - 18,667) 
    = < 37,333 
Based on the calculation, the frequency distribution tendency of 
Audit Delay could be seen in the table below. 
Table 3. Tendency Category of Audit Delay 
No Interval Frequency Frequency Relative Category 
1 > 74,667 39 37,14% High 
2 37,333 - 74,667 47 44,76% Medium 
3 < 37,333 19 18,10% Low 
 Total 105 100%  
 
From table 3, there are 39 samples (37,14%) in the high category for 
Audit Delay, 47 samples (44,76%) in the medium category, and 19 samples 
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(18,10%) in the low category. Therefore, it can be concluded that Audit 
Delay in the banking companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exhcange period 
2014-2016 are in the medium category. 
2. Board Size 
Table 4. The Result of Statistical Descriptive from Board Size 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Board Size 105 2 10 4,91 1,866 
Source: Appendix 
Board Size has a range of between 2 to 10 with an average of 4.89 
and a standard deviation of 1.887. Companies that have a total of 2 board of 
commissioners are Bank Mitraniaga (NAGA) and the Company with a total 
of 10 commissioners is Bank Negara Indonesia (BBNI) in 2016. 
The data of Board Size could be categorized on the following 
criterion bellow. 
a. High Category  = ( > iM + 1 iSD) 
b. Medium Category = (iM – 1 iSD) until (iM + 1 iSD) 
c. Low Category  = (iM – 1 iSD) 
The formula to calculate Ideal Mean (iM), Ideal Standard Deviation 
(iSD), High, Medium, and Low Category as follows. 
Ideal Mean (iM)  = ½ (Maximum Score - Minimum Score) 
    = ½ (10 – 2) 
    = 4 
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Ideal Standard Deviation = 1/6 (Maximum Score – Minimum Score) 
    = 1/6 (10-2) 
    = 1,333 
High Category  = > (iM + 1 iSD) 
    = > (4 + 1,333) 
    = > 5,333 
Medium Category  = iM – 1 iSD until iM + 1 iSD 
    = 4 – 1,333 until 4 + 1,333 
    = 2,667 until 5,333 
Low Category  = < (iM - 1 iSD) 
    = < (4 - 1,333) 
   = < 2,667 
Based on the calculation, the frequency distribution tendency of 
Board Size could be seen in the table below. 
Table 5. Tendency Category of Board Size 
No Interval Frequency Frequency Relative Category 
1 > 5,333 39 37,14% High 
2 2,667 - 5,333 62 59,05% Medium 
3 < 2,667 4 3,81% Low 
 Total 105 100%  
 
The table 5 shows that there are 39 samples (37,14%) in the high 
category for the Board Size, 62 samples (59,05%) in the medium category, 
and 2 samples (3,6%) in the low category. Therefore, it can be concluded 
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that the Board Size of banking companies listed in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange period 2014-2016 are in the medium category. 
3. Board of Independence Commissioner 
Table 6. The Result of Statistical Descriptive from Board of Independence 
Commissioner 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Board of 
Independence 
Commissioner 105 0,3333 1,0000 0,5760 0,0961 
Source: Appendix 
Board of Independence Commissioners is measured by dividing the 
number of board of independence commissioners to the total board of 
commissioners (Alfraih, 2016). The ratio of the board of independence 
commissioners shows an average of 0.576 / 57.6%, meaning that the 
existence of a board of independence commissioner in the company of 
57.6% of the entire board of commissioners. The range of values is 0.333 / 
33% up to 1.00 / 100% and the standard deviation of 0.1068. Companies 
with the lowest board of independent commissioner ratios are in Bank Of 
India Indonesia (BSWD) in 2014, while the highest is Bank Nationalnobu 
(NOBU) for the period of 2016. 
The data of Board of Independence Commissioner could be 
categorized on the following criterion bellow. 
a. High Category  = ( > iM + 1 iSD) 
b. Medium Category = (iM – 1 iSD) until (iM + 1 iSD) 
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c. Low Category  = (iM – 1 iSD) 
The formula to calculate Ideal Mean (iM), Ideal Standard Deviation 
(iSD), High, Medium, and Low Category as follows. 
Ideal Mean (iM)  = ½ (Maximum Score - Minimum Score) 
    = ½ (1,000 – 0,333) 
    = 0,334 
Ideal Standard Deviation = 1/6 (Maximum Score – Minimum Score) 
    = 1/6 (10-2) 
    = 0,111 
High Category  = > (iM + 1 iSD) 
    = > (0,334 + 0,111) 
    = > 0,445 
Medium Category  = iM – 1 iSD until iM + 1 iSD 
    = 0,334 – 0,111 until 0,334 + 0,111 
    = 0,223 until 0,445 
Low Category  = < (iM - 1 iSD) 
    = < (0,334 - 0,111) 
   = < 0,223 
Based on the calculation, the frequency distribution tendency of 
Board Size could be seen in the table below. 
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Table 7. Tendency Category from Board of Independence Commissioner 
No Interval Frequency Frequency Relative Category 
1 > 0,445 104 99,05% High 
2 0,223 - 0,445 1 0,95% Medium 
3 < 0,223 0 0,00% Low 
 Total 105 100%  
 
The table 7 shows that there are 104 samples (99,05%) in the high 
category for the Board of Independence Commissioner, 1 samples (0,95%) 
in the medium category, and 0 samples (0,00%) in the low category. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the Board of Independence 
Commissioner of banking companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange 
period 2014-2016 are in the high category. 
4. Institutional Ownership 
Table 8. The Result of Statistical Descriptive from Institutional Ownership 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Institutional 
Ownership 105 0,0000 0,9900 0,4763 0,2983 
Source: Appendix 
Institutional Ownership in this study has an average percentage of 
shares of institutions outside the company is 0.4763 / 47%. It shows that the 
average share of ownership shares owned by other institutions by 47%. The 
percentage of institutional ownership has a range of values 0.00 / 0% to 
0.990 / 99% and a standard deviation of 0.2983. Companies that have the 
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highest institutional ownership ratio are Bank JTrust Indonesia (BCIC) for 
the period for both 2014 and 2015. 
The data of Institutional Ownership could be categorized on the 
following criterion bellow. 
a. High Category  = ( > iM + 1 iSD) 
b. Medium Category = (iM – 1 iSD) until (iM + 1 iSD) 
c. Low Category  = (iM – 1 iSD) 
The formula to calculate Ideal Mean (iM), Ideal Standard Deviation 
(iSD), High, Medium, and Low Category as follows. 
Ideal Mean (iM)  = ½ (Maximum Score - Minimum Score) 
    = ½ (0,990 – 0,000) 
    = 0,495 
Ideal Standard Deviation = 1/6 (Maximum Score – Minimum Score) 
    = 1/6 (0,990-0,000) 
    = 0,165 
High Category  = > (iM + 1 iSD) 
    = > (0,495 + 0,165) 
    = > 0,660 
Medium Category  = iM – 1 iSD until iM + 1 iSD 
    = 0,495 – 0,165 until 0,495 + 0,165 
    = 0,330 until 0,660 
Low Category  = < (iM - 1 iSD) 
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    = < (0,495 - 0,165) 
   = < 0,330 
Based on the calculation, the frequency distribution tendency of 
Institutional Ownership could be seen in the table below. 
Table 9. Tendency Category of Institutional Ownership 
No Interval Frequency Frequency Relative Category 
1 > 0,660 38 36,19% High 
2 0,330 - 0,660 36 34,29% Medium 
3 < 0,330 31 29,52% Low 
 Total 105 100%  
 
From table 9, there are 38 samples (36,19%) in the high category for 
Institutional Ownership, 36 samples (34,29%) in the medium category, and 
31 samples (29,52%) in the low category. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
Institutional Ownership in the banking companies listed in Indonesia Stock 
Exhcange period 2014-2016 are in the high category. 
5. Governmental Ownership 
Table 10. The Result of Statistical Descriptive from Governmental Ownership 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Governmental 
Ownership 105 0,0000 0,8000 0,115185 0,2493529 
Source: Appendix 
Governmental Ownership owns an average shareholding by the 
Governmental of 11%. Then, the value range of the Governmental's 
ownership ratio is between 0.00 / 0% to 0.80 / 80% and the standard 
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deviation of 0.24935. The company with the largest Governmental 
ownership ratio is the Bank Pembangunan Daerah Jawa Timur (BJTM) 
which is 80%. 
The data of Governmental Ownership could be categorized on the 
following criterion bellow. 
a. High Category  = ( > iM + 1 iSD) 
b. Medium Category = (iM – 1 iSD) until (iM + 1 iSD) 
c. Low Category  = (iM – 1 iSD) 
The formula to calculate Ideal Mean (iM), Ideal Standard Deviation 
(iSD), High, Medium, and Low Category as follows. 
Ideal Mean (iM)  = ½ (Maximum Score - Minimum Score) 
    = ½ (0,800 – 0,000) 
    = 0,400 
Ideal Standard Deviation = 1/6 (Maximum Score – Minimum Score) 
    = 1/6 (0,800-0,000) 
    = 0,133 
High Category  = > (iM + 1 iSD) 
    = > (0,400 + 0,133) 
    = > 0,533 
Medium Category  = iM – 1 iSD until iM + 1 iSD 
    = 0,400 – 0,133 until 0,400 + 0,133 
    = 0,267 until 0,660 
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Low Category  = < (iM - 1 iSD) 
    = < (0,400 - 0,133) 
   = < 0,267 
Based on the calculation, the frequency distribution tendency of 
Governmental Ownership could be seen in the table below. 
Table 11. Tendency Category of Governmental Ownership 
No Interval Frequency Frequency Relative Category 
1 > 0,533 18 17,14% High 
2 0,267 - 0,533 0 0,00% Medium 
3 < 0,267 87 82,26% Low 
 Total 105 100%  
 
The table 11 shows that there are 18 samples (17,14%) in the high 
category for the Governmental Ownership, 0 samples (0,00%) in the 
medium category, and 87 samples (82,26%) in the low category. Therefore, 
it can be concluded that the Governmental Ownership of banking companies 
listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange period 2014-2016 are in the low 
category. 
C. The Result of Classic Assumption Test 
1. Normality Test 
The normality test in this study has a goal, whether, in a regression 
model, the intruder or residual variable has a normal distribution or not. A 
good regression model has normal or near-normal data distribution. 
Normality test used in this study is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test. The 
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basis for decision making in the K-S test is if the value of significance or 
probability value (sig) ≥ 0.05 or 5%, then the data is normally distributed. 
Conversely, if sig <0.05 or 5% then the data is not normally distributed 
(Ghozali, 2006). The following is the result of K-S calculation using 
statistical data processor: 
Table 12. The Result of Normality Test 
Asymp. Sig Explanation 
0,200 Normal Distribution 
 Source: Appendix 
Based on table 3, the value of significance in this study is 0.200, it 
means that the data is normally distributed. 
2. Autocorrelation Test 
The autocorrelation test is used to predict the existence of the 
relationship between errors of period t with the previous period. 
Autocorrelation is searched by Cochrane Orcutt method and using the 
Durbin Watson (DW-Test) formula. Data is not autocorrelated if dU <dW 
<4-dU. The results of autocorrelation testing are as follows: 
Table 13. The Result of Autocorrelation Test 
dU Durbin Watson 4 – dU Explanation 
1,7617 2,047 2,2383 No autocorrelation occurs 
Source: Appendix 
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The results of the autocorrelation test in the table show that the DW 
value is 2.047. The value is greater than the value of dU that is 1.7617 at the 
level of significance of 0.05 and smaller than the value of 4-dU is 2.2383 so 
there is no autocorrelation. 
3. Heteroscedasticity Test 
To perform heteroscedasticity test is by plotting a graph between 
SRESID and ZPRED in which heteroscedasticity disorder will appear in the 
presence of a particular pattern on the graph. Here is a heteroscedasticity test 
of this research model. 
Figure 4. The Result of Heteroscedasticity Test 
 53 
 
The above scatterplot graph shows that the pattern is no particular 
pattern on it. The point is relatively uniformly distributed, meaning that there 
is no heteroscedasticity disorder in the model in this study. 
4. Multicollinearity Test 
Multicollinearity test in this research is used to test the perfect 
correlation between one independent variable with one other independent 
variable. To detect the presence or absence of multicollinearity can be seen 
from tolerance value and VIF. Both of these measures show each 
independent variable described by other independent variables. Tolerance 
measures the variability of selected independent variables that are not 
explained by other independent variables. If tolerance value> 0.10 and VIF 
value <10, it can be concluded that there is no multicollinearity among 
independent variables in the regression model. The results of 
multicollinearity test in this study are as follows: 
Table 14. The Result of Multicolinearity Test 
Variable 
Calculation 
Explanation 
Tolerance VIF 
Board Size 0,647 1,484 There is no multicollinearity 
Board of 
Independent 
Commissioner 
0,783 1,277 There is no multicollinearity 
Institutional 
Ownership 
0,449 2,228 There is no multicollinearity 
Governmental 
Ownership 
0,423 2,363 There is no multicollinearity 
Source: Appendix 
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Based on the above table, it shows that all independent variables 
directly have a tolerance value of ≥ 0.10 and VIF ≤ 10. Thus, they imply  
that there is no multicollinearity. 
5. Linearity Test 
Linearity tests are used to ensure that research uses models that are 
supposed to be linear, squared, or cubic. Calculate linearity using the 
Lagrange multiplier test which is the development of the Ramsey Test. This 
test aims to get the value of the c2 count or n x R2. If c2 counts <c2 tables, it 
means the research uses a linear model. 
Table 15. The Result of Linearity Test 
The value of R2 in LM The value of c2 table Explanation 
0,42 124,34 Linear 
 Source: Appendix 
The results of calculations through statistical devices show that R2 is 
0.42. The number of observations in this study is 105. The value the of c2 
arithmetic is 0.42 (n x R2 = 105 x 0.004). Comparing with the c2 table, it is 
less than 124.32 (0.42 <124.32). It means that this model is a linear. 
D. The Result of Hypothesis Test 
The multiple linear regression analysis is used to deremine the effect of 
independent variables, i.e. board size, the board of independence commissioners, 
institutional ownership, and Governmental ownership of dependent variable, i.e. 
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audit delay simultaneously. The calculation results of multiple linear regression 
are as follows: 
Table 16. The Result of Multiple Linear Regression Test 
Variable Regression Coefficient 
Constanta 120,394 
Board Size -6,987 
Board of Independent Commissioner -17,367 
Institutional Ownership -23,803 
Governmental Ownership -44,919 
R Square 0,513 
F Count 28,440 
F Table 2,46 
Sig F 0,000 
Source: Appendix 
The equation of regression line for the hypothesis is as follows: 
𝑌 = 120,394 − 6,987𝑋1 − 17,367𝑋2 − 23,803𝑋3 − 44,919𝑋4 
It depicts that Board Size variable gives a coefficient value equal to -
6,987, Board of Independent Commissioner variable gives a coefficient value 
equal to -17,367, Institutional Ownership variable gives a coefficient value equal 
to -23,803, and Governmental Ownership variable gives a coefficient value equal 
to -44,919. The F statistic test for the independence variable yields an F value of 
28.440. When compared with the value of F table at a significance level of 5% 
that is equal to 2.46 then the value of F arithmetic is greater than F table 
(28.440> 2.46). A significance value of 0 in which less than 0.05 also supports 
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the results of this study, so the hypothesis is accepted. So the conclusion is that 
Board size, Board of independence commissioners, Institutional Ownership, and 
Governmental Ownership simultaneously have a significant effect on Audit 
Delay on banking companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2014-
2016. 
By testing the coefficient of determination can show how much 
independent variable in the research is able to explain the dependent variable. 
The result of a test of determination coefficient of this research yield value of R 
square equal to 0,513 or 51,3%, thus; Board size, Board of independence 
commissioners, Institutional Ownership, and Governmental Ownership 
simultaneously affect the Delay Audit of 51.3% and the rest is influenced by 
variables outside this study. 
Researcher interprets the result of multiple linear regression analysis from 
each influence of the independent variable with the dependent variable, as 
follows: 
1. Board Size  
Table 17. The Result of Multiple Linear Regression Test from Board 
Size 
Variable t value Sig t Table 
Board Size -6,854 0,000 1,66023 
Source: Appendix 
Based on t value of the Board size variable is -6.854, smaller than t 
table by 1.66023. The significance value of the Board Size variable on 
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multiple linear regression test results, it has a significance value of 0.00, 
smaller than 0.05. A negative t value indicates that the larger the Board 
Size will shorten Audit Delay. A significance value of less than 0.05 also 
indicates that the influence of the Board Size is significant. Based on these 
results, the Board Size has a significant negative effect on Audit Delay. 
2. Board of Independent Commissioner 
The results of calculations from Board of independence 
commissioners variables can be seen in the following table: 
Table 18. The Result of Multiple Regression Linearity Test from Board 
of Independent Commissioner 
Variable t value Sig t Table 
Board of 
Independent 
Commissioner 
-0,946 0,346 1,66023 
Source: Appendix 
The t value of Board of independence commissioners has a value of -
0.946, smaller than t table 1.66023 and significance value of 0.346, higher 
than 0.05. A negative t value means that the Independent Commissioner 
negatively affects Audit Delay, but a higher significance value of 0.05 
indicates that the effect is insignificant. Therefore, the result of the 
conclusion is that the Board of Commissioners does not have a significant 
impact on Audit Delay. 
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3. Institutional Ownership 
The results from the calculation of Institutional Ownership can be seen 
in the following table: 
Table 19. The Result of Multiple Regression Linearity Test from 
Institutional Ownership 
Variable t value Sig t Table 
Institutional 
Ownership 
-3,046 0,003 1,66023 
Source: Appendix 
The result of multiple linear regression test on the Institutional 
Ownership variable has t value of -3.046, smaller than 1.66023 and the 
significance value is 0.003, less than 0.05. A negative t value means the 
greater its Institutional Ownership will minimize Audit Delay. Then, a 
significance value of less than 0.05 indicates that the Institutional 
Ownership has a significant effect. Thus, from the above results, the 
Institutional Ownership variable has a significant negative effect on Audit 
Delay. 
4. Governmental Ownership 
The results of calculations from Governmental Ownership variables 
can be seen in the table as follows: 
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Table 20. The Result of Multiple Regression Linearity Test from 
Governmental Ownership 
Variable t value Sig t Table 
Governmental 
Ownership 
-4,666 0,000 1,66023 
Source: Appendix 
The t value of the Governmental Ownership variable is -4.666, smaller 
than 1.66023, and significance value of 0.00, less than 0.05. A negative t 
value means that Governmental Owners negatively influence Audit Delay. 
A value of significantly lower than 0.05 indicates that the effect is 
significant. Thus, the greater the Governmental Ownership will have a 
significant negative impact on Audit Delay. 
E. Discussion 
Hypothesis test of; Board Size, Board of independence commissioners, 
Institutional Ownership, and Governmental Ownership simultaneously have a 
significant effect on Audit Delay on banking companies listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange in 2014-2016, showing a significance level of 0, below 0.05. 
The F statistic test for the independence variable yields an F value of 28.440. 
When compared with the F table at a significance level of 5% is equal to 2.46 
then the f arithmetic is greater than f table (38.320> 2.46). Thus, the hypothesis 
that there is a significant influence over Board Size, Board of independence 
commissioners, Institutional Ownership, and Governmental Ownership 
simultaneously to audit delay is acceptable. 
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Depend on the coefficient of determination can show how much 
independent variable in the research can explain the dependent variable. The 
result of a test of determination coefficient of this research yield value of R 
square equal to 0,513 or 51,3%, thus; Board Size, Board of independence 
commissioners, Institutional Ownership, and Governmental Ownership 
simultaneously affect the Delay Audit of 51.3% and the rest is influenced by 
variables outside this study. 
From multiple linear regression test above then can be seen the influence 
of independent variable to dependent variable separately as follows: 
1. The Effect of Board Size on Audit Delay (Banking Company Listed on IDX 
in 2014-2016) 
Board size in this study is the total amount of the board of 
commissioners owned by the company. Given a large number of the boards 
of commissioners makes it easier to control the effectiveness company's 
decisions and in handling corporate agency issues of separation of ownership 
and control of the company. Based on the significance value of the Board 
Size variable on multiple linear regression test results, it has a significance 
value of 0.00, smaller than 0.05. The t value of the Board size variable is -
6.854, lower than t table 1.66023. The results of this study indicate that there 
is a significant negative effect of Board size on Audit Delay. 
Thus, the overall number of the larger board of commissioners tends to 
work more effectively than the few boards of commissioners. The function 
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of the board of commissioners runs better supported by large numbers in 
order to supervise the company's operational policies and advise the 
directors. This is in line with research by Faishal and Hadiprajitno (2015), 
that the greater the number of boards of commissioners the better the 
supervision will be, thus the company's performance increases and leads to 
improved quality of financial statements so as to reduce audit delay. This 
result is inconsistent with Alfraih (2016) which states that the increasing 
number of corporate commissioners will result in less effective coordination 
as there will be potential from one of the councils that are not working or 
"hiring". Nevertheless, the results of this study show that the size of the 
board of commissioners speeds up the audit delay process. 
2. The Effect of Board of Independent Commissioner on Audit Delay (Baking 
Company Listed on IDX in 2014-2016) 
The significance value of Board of independence commissioners has a 
value of 0.346, higher than 0.05 and the t arithmetic -0.946, smaller than the 
t table 1.66023. Then the conclusion is that the independent commissioner's 
variables have no significant effect on Audit Delay. This is not in line with 
the study of Bradburry et al. (2006) stating that independent parties 
dominating over the composition of the board of commissioners will 
intensify audit performance, making it more effective in reducing audit 
delay. The structure of an independent board may reduce the time of audit 
delay. However, the results are not significant. It is alleged that the 
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performance between the board of independence commissioners and non-
board of independence commissioners has no difference. Thus, their 
performance as a whole has more significance over shortening audit delay 
than their composition. Thus, the performance of the board of commissioners 
as a whole has more significance over shortening audit delay than the 
composition of board of independence commissioners themselves. 
3. The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Audit Delay (Banking Companies 
Listed on IDX in 2014-2016) 
The result of multiple linear regression tests on the Institutional 
Ownership variable has a significance value of 0.003, smaller than 0.05 and t 
value of -3.046, less than 1.66023. Thus, the conclusion is that the variable 
of Institutional Ownership has a significant effect on audit delay. Companies 
that focus on institutional ownership shares tend to be effective in shortening 
audit delay time. The presence of a concentration of outside than inside 
ownership provides the effect that can give clear performance limits and 
monitor them. Thus, institutional investors can press the management of the 
company to accelerate the completion of financial statements, thus 
shortening audit delay. 
This result is in line with Swami and Latrini's research (2013) that the 
institution can demand the completion of the audit report immediately so that 
it can be used as a decision maker tool by interested parties. Junaidda (2017) 
also notes that the more institutional ownership in the company, the 
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possibility of accelerating audit delay will be higher. This happens when an 
institution has large corporate rights, they tend to be better at developing 
management strategies in decision making and tend to be more active in 
monitoring the company's performance. 
4. The Effect of Governmental Ownership on Audit Delay (Banking 
Companies Listed on IDX in 2014-2016) 
The significance value of Governmental Ownership variables has a 
value of 0.00, smaller than 0.05 and t count -4.666, lower than 1.66023. 
Thus, the conclusion is that Governmental Ownership variable has a 
significant effect on audit delay. The existence of existing Governmental 
stock ownership in a company can accelerate the completion of the 
company's audited financial statements, thus shortening audit delay. This 
result is in line with Wei (2012) research that the Governmental as the 
controlling shareholder may be able to impose higher pressure on the 
company and the timely delivery of financial statements. Strong authority 
exists in companies where the greatest power belongs to the Governmental. 
The results are not in line with Lim (2012) that companies will tend to 
report their financial statements promptly because there is no greater 
external influence from the Governmental. Management performance tends 
to be inefficient and undisciplined against market regulation. Nevertheless, 
this study gives different results. It is probable that state-owned enterprises 
are more disciplinary over market regulation. Thus, performance 
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management can be more efficient, leading to the preparation of financial 
statements more quickly and minimize audit delay of a company. 
F. Research Limitation 
The results of this study have some limitations that affect the results of 
research. Limitations in this study are as follows:  
1. This study uses company secondary data from the company's financial 
statements. Meanwhile, this study does not look at the external auditor’s 
side, such as; the length of the audit work contract, the number of external 
auditor personnel available, or the external auditor already has an audit work 
contract with another company 
2. The focus of the research shows that the results of audit delays on banking 
companies cannot provide general results for all types of companies. 
3. The independent variables in this study which are limited to corporate 
governance mechanisms only give results of the effect of audit delay on 
these variables. Research cannot provide results on the effect on audit delay 
with variables not used by researcher, so there are still many variables that 
have not been used in similar studies. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
 
A. Conclusions 
Based on the results of the data analysis in the previous section, the 
conclusion is that there is a significant influence of Board Size, Board of 
independence commissioners, Institutional Ownership, and Governmental 
Ownership to Audit Delay on Banking Companies listed on Indonesia Stock 
Exchange 2014-2016. The result of significant value 0.00 which is smaller than 
0.05 indicates that the Board Size, Board of independence commissioners, 
Institutional Ownership, and Governmental Ownership simultaneously affect 
the Delay Audit on Banking Companies listed on the IDX in 2014-2016. Based 
on the result of the R square value of 0,513 means the variable of Board Size, 
Independent Board of Commissioner, Institutional Ownership, and 
Governmental Ownership affects the Delay Audit of 51.3%, while other factors 
outside this research explain the rest of 48.7%. 
Results from multiple linear regression test tests then the conclusion 
between independent variables to the dependent variable partially, among 
others as follows: 
1. Variables of Board Size have a negative and significant impact on Audit 
Delay on Banking Companies Listed on IDX in 2014-2016. The results of 
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statistical tests t prove the value of -6.584, smaller than the value of t table 
of 1.66023. Significance shows a number of 0.00, smaller than 0.05. 
2. Variables of Board of independence commissioners negatively affect Audit 
Delay on Banking Companies Listed on IDX in 2014-2016. The results of 
statistical test t that gives a value of -0.946, smaller than the value of t table 
of 1.66023. Value significance of 0.346, means greater than 0.05, so it does 
not give a significant effect. 
3. Variables of Institutional Ownership have a negative and significant impact 
on Audit Delay on Banking Companies Listed on IDX in 2014-2016. The 
result of statistical test t proves the value of -3.046, smaller than the value 
of t table of 1.66023. Significance shows a number of 0.003, smaller than 
0.05. 
4. Variables of Governmental Ownership have a negative and significant 
impact on Delay Audit on Banking Companies Listed on IDX in 2014-
2016. The results of statistical test t gives a value of -4.666, smaller than 
the value of t table of 1.66023. Value significance of 0.00, less than 0.05. 
B. Suggestions 
Based on the results of these studies and conclusions, the researchers 
provide suggestions as follows: 
1. For Auditor 
The results of this study can be used to find out about data from 
Audit Delay on Banking Companies registered in IDX 2014-2016. 
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Auditors can use this research as well as consideration to know the factors 
that affect audit delay of a company. 
2. For Companies 
Companies can re-evaluate the factors that may affect Audit Delay. 
This study gives the dominant result that the size of board commissioner is 
giving a more significant effect rather than the board of independent 
commissioner ratio, it means that the larger number of board of 
commissioners makes work more effectively. Thus it can shorten Audit 
Delay. 
3. For Investors and Potential Investors 
For investors and potential investors who will invest in the capital 
market, can pay attention to the factors that can affect the audit delay. 
Investors can also know about companies that tend to adhere to capital 
market regulations. 
4. For Next Researchers 
Researchers and academics can do the same research by adding other 
industry sectors to get more samples, so get results that can strengthen or 
add to the conclusions of previous studies. The researcher can also add 
more independent variables such as the audit committee, managerial 
ownership, and can add financial ratios to test Audit Delay. 
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Appendix 1. List of Research Population 
No Code Company’s Name 
1 AGRO Bank Rakyat Indonesia Agro Niaga Tbk 
2 AGRS Bank Agris Tbk 
3 ARTO Bank Artos Indonesia Tbk 
4 BABP Bank MNC Internasional Tbk 
5 BACA Bank Capital Indonesia Tbk 
6 BBCA Bank Central Asia Tbk 
7 BBHI Bank Harda Intenasional Tbk 
8 BBKP Bank Bukopin Tbk 
9 BBMD Bank Mestika Dharma Tbk 
10 BBNI Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) Tbk 
11 BBNP Bank Nusantara Parahyangan Tbk 
12 BBRI Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk 
13 BBTN Bank Tabungan Negara (Persero) Tbk 
14 BBYB Bank Yudha Bhakti Tbk 
15 BCIC Bank JTrust Indonesia Tbk 
16 BDMN Bank Danamon Indonesia Tbk 
17 BEKS BPD Banten Tbk 
18 BGTB Bank Ganesha Tbk 
19 BINA Bank Ina Perdana Tbk 
20 BJBR Bank Pembangunan Daerah Jabar dan Banten Tbk 
21 BJTM Bank Pembangunan Daerah Jawa Timur Tbk 
22 BKSW Bank QNB Indonesia Tbk 
23 BMAS Bank Maspion Indonesia Tbk 
24 BMRI Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk 
25 BNBA Bank Bumi Arta Tbk 
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No Code Company’s Name 
26 BNGA Bank CIMB Niaga Tbk 
27 BNII Bank Maybank Indonesia Tbk 
28 BNLI Bank Permata Tbk 
29 BSIM Bank Sinar Mas Tbk 
30 BSWD Bank of India Indonesia Tbk 
31 BTPN Bank Tabungan Pensiunan Nasional Tbk 
32 BVIC Bank Victoria International Tbk 
33 DNAR Bank Dinar Indonesia Tbk 
34 INPC Bank Artha Graha International Tbk 
35 MAYA Bank Mayapada International Tbk 
36 MCOR Bank Windu Kentjana International Tbk 
37 MEGA Bank Mega Tbk 
38 NAGA Bank Mitraniaga Tbk 
39 NISP Bank OCBC NISP Tbk 
40 NOBU Bank Nationalnobu Tbk 
41 PNBN Bank Pan Indonesia Tbk 
42 PNBS Bank Panin Syariah Tbk 
43 SDRA Bank Woori Saudara Indonesia 1906 Tbk 
 Source: www.sahamok.com/ banking company 2014-2016 (Processed data) 
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Appendix 2. List of Research Sample 
No Code Company’s Name 
1 AGRO Bank Rakyat Indonesia Agro Niaga Tbk 
2 BABP Bank MNC Internasional Tbk 
3 BACA Bank Capital Indonesia Tbk 
4 BBCA Bank Central Asia Tbk 
5 BBKP Bank Bukopin Tbk 
6 BBMD Bank Mestika Dharma Tbk 
7 BBNI Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) Tbk 
8 BBNP Bank Nusantara Parahyangan Tbk 
9 BBRI Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk 
10 BBTN Bank Tabungan Negara (Persero) Tbk 
11 BCIC Bank JTrust Indonesia Tbk 
12 BDMN Bank Danamon Indonesia Tbk 
13 BEKS BPD Banten Tbk 
14 BJBR Bank Pembangunan Daerah Jabar dan Banten Tbk 
15 BJTM Bank Pembangunan Daerah Jawa Timur Tbk 
16 BKSW Bank QNB Indonesia Tbk 
17 BMAS Bank Maspion Indonesia Tbk 
18 BMRI Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk 
19 BNBA Bank Bumi Arta Tbk 
20 BNGA Bank CIMB Niaga Tbk 
21 BNII Bank Maybank Indonesia Tbk 
22 BNLI Bank Permata Tbk 
23 BSIM Bank Sinar Mas Tbk 
24 BSWD Bank of India Indonesia Tbk 
25 BTPN Bank Tabungan Pensiunan Nasional Tbk 
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No Code Company’s Name 
26 BVIC Bank Victoria International Tbk 
27 INPC Bank Artha Graha International Tbk 
28 MAYA Bank Mayapada International Tbk 
29 MCOR Bank Windu Kentjana International Tbk 
30 MEGA Bank Mega Tbk 
31 NAGA Bank Mitraniaga Tbk 
32 NISP Bank OCBC NISP Tbk 
33 NOBU Bank Nationalnobu Tbk 
34 PNBN Bank Pan Indonesia Tbk 
35 SDRA Bank Woori Saudara Indonesia 1906 Tbk 
 Source: Processed data (2018) 
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Appendix 3. Data of Corporate Governance Mechanisms Period 2014 
No Code 
Audit 
Delay 
Board 
Size 
Board of 
Independence 
Commissioner 
Institutiona
l 
Ownership 
Governmenta
l Ownership 
1 AGRO 55 5 0,60 0,81 0,00 
2 BABP 75 3 0,67 0,40 0,00 
3 BACA 86 3 0,67 0,54 0,00 
4 BBCA 47 5 0,60 0,47 0,00 
5 BBKP 86 4 0,50 0,25 0,11 
6 BBMD 72 4 0,50 0,89 0,00 
7 BBNI 22 8 0,50 0,00 0,60 
8 BBNP 51 4 0,50 0,66 0,00 
9 BBRI 16 7 0,71 0,00 0,57 
10 BBTN 54 5 0,60 0,00 0,60 
11 BCIC 86 2 0,50 0,99 0,00 
12 BDMN 16 6 0,50 0,67 0,00 
13 BEKS 65 3 0,67 0,68 0,00 
14 BJBR 63 7 0,57 0,00 0,75 
15 BJTM 58 4 0,50 0,00 0,80 
16 BKSW 27 6 0,50 0,83 0,00 
17 BMAS 83 3 0,67 0,68 0,00 
18 BMRI 33 7 0,57 0,00 0,60 
19 BNBA 82 3 0,67 0,45 0,00 
20 BNGA 42 8 0,50 0,97 0,00 
21 BNII 42 6 0,50 0,45 0,00 
22 BNLI 51 8 0,50 0,45 0,00 
23 BSIM 77 3 0,67 0,53 0,00 
24 BSWD 65 3 0,33 0,76 0,00 
25 BTPN 62 6 0,50 0,40 0,00 
26 BVIC 89 4 0,75 0,39 0,00 
27 INPC 77 6 0,50 0,17 0,00 
28 MAYA 83 5 0,60 0,22 0,00 
29 MCOR 83 3 0,67 0,67 0,00 
30 MEGA 71 3 0,67 0,58 0,00 
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No Code 
Audit 
Delay 
Board 
Size 
Board of 
Independence 
Commissioner 
Institutiona
l 
Ownership 
Governmenta
l Ownership 
31 NAGA 82 2 0,50 0,72 0,00 
32 NISP 41 8 0,50 0,85 0,00 
33 NOBU 86 3 0,67 0,23 0,00 
34 PNBN 37 5 0,60 0,46 0,00 
35 SDRA 85 4 0,75 0,74 0,00 
Source: www.idx.co.id/ banking company 2014 (Processed data) 
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Appendix 4. Data of Corporate Governance Mechanisms Period 2015 
No Code 
Audit 
Delay 
Board 
Size 
Board of 
Independence 
Commissioner 
Institutiona
l 
Ownership 
Governmenta
l Ownership 
1 AGRO 53 4 0,50 0,88 0,00 
2 BABP 70 3 0,67 0,39 0,00 
3 BACA 83 3 0,67 0,28 0,00 
4 BBCA 47 5 0,60 0,47 0,00 
5 BBKP 74 6 0,50 0,30 0,11 
6 BBMD 81 4 0,50 0,89 0,00 
7 BBNI 25 8 0,63 0,00 0,60 
8 BBNP 54 4 0,50 0,66 0,00 
9 BBRI 29 8 0,63 0,00 0,57 
10 BBTN 29 7 0,57 0,00 0,60 
11 BCIC 78 4 0,75 0,99 0,00 
12 BDMN 61 7 0,57 0,67 0,00 
13 BEKS 119 4 0,50 0,68 0,00 
14 BJBR 57 4 0,75 0,00 0,75 
15 BJTM 7 5 0,60 0,00 0,80 
16 BKSW 11 6 0,50 0,83 0,00 
17 BMAS 88 3 0,67 0,68 0,00 
18 BMRI 28 8 0,50 0,00 0,60 
19 BNBA 84 3 0,67 0,45 0,00 
20 BNGA 55 8 0,50 0,97 0,00 
21 BNII 54 6 0,50 0,45 0,00 
22 BNLI 49 8 0,50 0,45 0,00 
23 BSIM 55 3 0,67 0,53 0,00 
24 BSWD 76 3 0,67 0,76 0,00 
25 BTPN 60 6 0,50 0,40 0,00 
26 BVIC 89 4 0,50 0,39 0,00 
27 INPC 82 6 0,50 0,17 0,00 
28 MAYA 88 4 0,50 0,25 0,00 
29 MCOR 55 3 0,67 0,59 0,00 
30 MEGA 78 4 0,50 0,58 0,00 
 81 
 
No Code 
Audit 
Delay 
Board 
Size 
Board of 
Independence 
Commissioner 
Institutiona
l 
Ownership 
Governmenta
l Ownership 
31 NAGA 74 2 0,50 0,72 0,00 
32 NISP 25 8 0,50 0,85 0,00 
33 NOBU 76 3 0,67 0,23 0,00 
34 PNBN 50 6 0,50 0,46 0,00 
35 SDRA 55 4 0,75 0,74 0,00 
Source: www.idx.co.id/ banking company 2015 (Processed data) 
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Appendix 5. Data of Corporate Governance Mechanisms Period 2016 
No Code 
Audit 
Delay 
Board 
Size 
Board of 
Independence 
Commissioner 
Institutiona
l 
Ownership 
Governmenta
l Ownership 
1 AGRO 41 4 0,50 0,88 0,00 
2 BABP 61 3 0,67 0,39 0,00 
3 BACA 88 3 0,67 0,13 0,00 
4 BBCA 45 5 0,60 0,55 0,00 
5 BBKP 88 7 0,43 0,30 0,11 
6 BBMD 79 4 0,50 0,89 0,00 
7 BBNI 20 10 0,50 0,00 0,60 
8 BBNP 59 4 0,50 0,68 0,00 
9 BBRI 20 8 0,63 0,00 0,57 
10 BBTN 41 7 0,57 0,00 0,60 
11 BCIC 59 5 0,60 0,95 0,00 
12 BDMN 55 6 0,50 0,67 0,00 
13 BEKS 76 4 0,50 0,51 0,00 
14 BJBR 60 5 0,60 0,00 0,75 
15 BJTM 7 5 0,60 0,00 0,80 
16 BKSW 30 5 0,60 0,50 0,00 
17 BMAS 73 3 0,67 0,72 0,00 
18 BMRI 30 8 0,50 0,00 0,60 
19 BNBA 79 3 0,67 0,45 0,00 
20 BNGA 50 8 0,50 0,91 0,00 
21 BNII 45 6 0,50 0,45 0,00 
22 BNLI 47 8 0,50 0,45 0,00 
23 BSIM 76 3 0,67 0,56 0,00 
24 BSWD 86 4 0,50 0,76 0,00 
25 BTPN 48 6 0,50 0,40 0,00 
26 BVIC 58 4 0,50 0,50 0,00 
27 INPC 82 6 0,50 0,16 0,00 
28 MAYA 79 3 0,67 0,40 0,00 
29 MCOR 89 3 0,67 0,60 0,00 
30 MEGA 59 4 0,50 0,58 0,00 
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No Code 
Audit 
Delay 
Board 
Size 
Board of 
Independence 
Commissioner 
Institutiona
l 
Ownership 
Governmenta
l Ownership 
31 NAGA 72 2 0,50 0,72 0,00 
32 NISP 25 7 0,57 0,85 0,00 
33 NOBU 74 3 1,00 0,23 0,00 
34 PNBN 48 6 0,50 0,46 0,00 
35 SDRA 54 4 0,75 0,74 0,00 
Source: www.idx.co.id/ banking company 2016 (Processed data) 
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Appendix 6. The Result of Descriptive Statistic 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Audit Delay 105 7,0 119,0 59,543 22,8301 
Board Size 105 2,0 10,0 4,914 1,8663 
Board of Independence 
Commissioner 
105 ,3333 1,000 ,575997 ,0961523 
Institutional Ownership 105 ,0000 ,9900 ,476290 ,2982766 
Governmental 
Ownership 
105 ,0000 ,8000 ,115185 ,2493529 
Valid N (listwise) 105     
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Appendix 7. The Result of Normality Test 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
 
Unstandardized 
Residual 
N 105 
Normal Parametersa,b Mean ,0000000 
Std. Deviation 15,61504146 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute ,060 
Positive ,051 
Negative -,060 
Test Statistic ,060 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,200c,d 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
b. Calculated from data. 
c. Lilliefors Significance Correction. 
d. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
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Appendix 8. The Result of Autocorrelation Test 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Lag_Y 43,6744 20,74445 104 
Lag_X1 3,5990 1,67515 104 
Lag_X2 ,4224 ,09221 104 
Lag_X3 ,3466 ,25616 104 
Lag_X4 ,0852 ,20582 104 
 
Correlations 
 Lag_Y Lag_X1 Lag_X2 Lag_X3 Lag_X4 
Pearson Correlation Lag_Y 1,000 -,628 ,178 ,228 -,467 
Lag_X1 -,628 1,000 -,353 -,307 ,429 
Lag_X2 ,178 -,353 1,000 -,132 ,036 
Lag_X3 ,228 -,307 -,132 1,000 -,741 
Lag_X4 -,467 ,429 ,036 -,741 1,000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Lag_Y . ,000 ,035 ,010 ,000 
Lag_X1 ,000 . ,000 ,001 ,000 
Lag_X2 ,035 ,000 . ,091 ,358 
Lag_X3 ,010 ,001 ,091 . ,000 
Lag_X4 ,000 ,000 ,358 ,000 . 
N Lag_Y 104 104 104 104 104 
Lag_X1 104 104 104 104 104 
Lag_X2 104 104 104 104 104 
Lag_X3 104 104 104 104 104 
Lag_X4 104 104 104 104 104 
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Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed 
Met
hod 
1 Lag_X4, 
Lag_X2, 
Lag_X1, 
Lag_X3b 
. 
Ent
er 
a. Dependent Variable: Lag_Y 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 ,686a ,471 ,450 15,38857 ,471 22,043 4 99 ,000 2,047 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Lag_X4, Lag_X2, Lag_X1, Lag_X3 
b. Dependent Variable: Lag_Y 
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Appendix 9. The Result of Heteroscedasticity Test 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 Governmental 
Ownership, 
Board of 
Independence 
Commissioner, 
Board Size, 
Institutional 
Ownershipb 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Audit Delay 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 ,730a ,532 ,513 15,9243 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Governmental Ownership, Board of 
Independence Commissioner, Board Size, Institutional Ownership 
b. Dependent Variable: Audit Delay 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 28847,787 4 7211,947 28,440 ,000b 
Residual 25358,270 100 253,583   
Total 54206,057 104    
a. Dependent Variable: Audit Delay 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Governmental Ownership, Board of Independence Commissioner, Board 
Size, Institutional Ownership 
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 120,394 14,809  8,130 ,000 
Board Size -6,987 1,019 -,571 -6,854 ,000 
Board of independence 
commissioner 
-17,367 18,349 -,073 -,946 ,346 
Institutional Ownership -23,803 7,813 -,311 -3,046 ,003 
Governmental Ownership -44,919 9,626 -,491 -4,666 ,000 
a. Dependent Variable: Audit Delay 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 14,888 84,760 59,543 16,6548 105 
Std. Predicted Value -2,681 1,514 ,000 1,000 105 
Standard Error of Predicted 
Value 
1,878 7,484 3,337 ,973 105 
Adjusted Predicted Value 14,384 84,529 59,462 16,7125 105 
Residual -39,0314 51,4239 ,0000 15,6150 105 
Std. Residual -2,451 3,229 ,000 ,981 105 
Stud. Residual -2,493 3,268 ,002 1,004 105 
Deleted Residual -40,3919 52,6763 ,0808 16,3819 105 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2,562 3,441 ,003 1,018 105 
Mahal. Distance ,456 21,982 3,962 3,188 105 
Cook's Distance ,000 ,100 ,010 ,018 105 
Centered Leverage Value ,004 ,211 ,038 ,031 105 
a. Dependent Variable: Audit Delay 
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Appendix 10. The Result of Multicolinearity Test 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 120,394 14,809  8,130 ,000   
Board Size -6,987 1,019 -,571 -6,854 ,000 ,674 1,484 
Board of 
independence 
commissioner 
-17,367 18,349 -,073 -,946 ,346 ,783 1,277 
Institutional 
Ownership 
-23,803 7,813 -,311 -3,046 ,003 ,449 2,228 
Governmental 
Ownership 
-44,919 9,626 -,491 -4,666 ,000 ,423 2,363 
a. Dependent Variable: Audit Delay 
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Appendix 11. The Result of Linearity Test 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 X4Kuadrat, 
X2Kuadrat, 
X1Kuadrat, 
X3Kuadratb 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Unstandardized Residual 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 ,060a ,004 -,036 15,89589618 
a. Predictors: (Constant), X4Kuadrat, X2Kuadrat, X1Kuadrat, 
X3Kuadrat 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 90,319 4 22,580 ,089 ,986b 
Residual 25267,952 100 252,680   
Total 25358,270 104    
a. Dependent Variable: Unstandardized Residual 
b. Predictors: (Constant), X4Kuadrat, X2Kuadrat, X1Kuadrat, X3Kuadrat 
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -3,129 7,053  -,444 ,658 
X1Kuadrat ,032 ,089 ,042 ,365 ,716 
X2Kuadrat 3,915 14,258 ,030 ,275 ,784 
X3Kuadrat 2,961 6,508 ,053 ,455 ,650 
X4Kuadrat -,460 11,020 -,005 -,042 ,967 
a. Dependent Variable: Unstandardized Residual 
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Appendix 12. The Result of Multiple Linear Regression Test 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 28847,787 4 7211,947 28,440 ,000b 
Residual 25358,270 100 253,583   
Total 54206,057 104    
a. Dependent Variable: Audit Delay 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Governmental Ownership, Board of independence commissioner, Board 
Size, Institutional Ownership 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 120,394 14,809  8,130 ,000 
Board Size -6,987 1,019 -,571 -6,854 ,000 
Board of independence 
commissioner 
-17,367 18,349 -,073 -,946 ,346 
Institutional Ownership -23,803 7,813 -,311 -3,046 ,003 
Governmental Ownership -44,919 9,626 -,491 -4,666 ,000 
a. Dependent Variable: Audit Delay 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 ,730a ,532 ,513 15,9243 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Governmental Ownership, Board of 
independence commissioner, Board Size, Institutional Ownership 
 
